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forces of society, in response to a divine imperative, worked in a wondrous fashion beside which the cleverest political contrivances stood as pale imitations.
These constitute some of the main elements in the conservative tradition as it developed near the end of the eighteenth century. It is against this background that the earlier conservatism of Hume assumes some significance. The first fundamental respect in which his position differed from that outlined above was that his was a conservatism without benefit of mystery. There was no recourse to a "divine tactic," a Weltgeist; nor any disposition, such as displayed by Coleridge, to revive Scripture as a "statesman's manual." Hume's conclusions were stubbornly rooted in a strictly secular analysis with experience as the final court of appeal. Secondly, Hume's conservatism was constructed from the very materials of the Enlightenment: its quest for objective analysis, its distrust of obscurantism, its faith in empirical data, its disdain for the a priori, and its strong emphasis on the criterion of utility. He employed the Enlightenment methods of analysis to probe the roots of established pieties and institutions, and he carried it out with the sort of dispassion that Coleridge was to call "cold-blooded." Thirdly, his was a conservatism which owed no inspiration to catastrophe, impending or past, but rather reflected the "peace of the Augustans." Consequently, Hume exhibited none of the heightened sensitivity of later conservatives to the necessity for strong authority as the main guarantor of unity. Where later De Bonald was to assert that "outside religious and political unity man can find no truth and society no salvation," Hume was content with the matter-of-fact judgment that society was a product of human interests whose satisfaction provided the requisite amount of social cohesion.
Nevertheless, Hume was something more than the Enlightenment incarnate, for his significance is that he turned against the Enlightenment its own weapons. And herein lies his importance as a conservative thinker. His starting-point is to be found in A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) which bears the subtitle "An attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects." The first book illustrates Hume's tactic: to whittle down the claims of reason by the use of rational analysis. Reason, he contended, was admittedly an instrument for advancing our knowledge, but it was an instrument with a circumscribed sphere of activity:
Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood. Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement is incapable of being true or false, and can never be an object of reason.6
The consequence of this conclusion was to stake off an important realm either impervious to reason or within which reason played only a derivative role. Thus what men described as cause-and-effect was not a deductive conclusion of reason but the product of experience: we have become accustomed to seeing a certain effect follow from a given cause, but, strictly speaking, there existed no logically necessary connection between the two. Facts were derived from observation, not from reason; hence reason could not be employed to prove or disprove the existence of a fact. Human behavior, in turn, was governed largely by unanalyzed experience or habits. "Custom," Hume concluded, "is the great guide of human life."7
The significance of Hume's argument was not merely that it greatly extended the reign of custom at the expense of reason, but that it undercut the whole idea of an underlying rational harmony in nature, a harmony from which eightteenth-century rationalists had deduced the existence of universal moral imperatives. Hume destroyed this assumption, not by a frontal assault, but by the contention that the external order was not a discovery of reason but was rooted in "the principles of human nature." The 'order' that we attribute to the phenomenal world rests really on a conviction and not on a process of logical validation; it is the "force and vivacity" which the idea of an 'order' exerts on our imagination that explains its hold.8
Equally modest was the role assigned reason by Hume in matters of morals. Reason functioned as a calculator, an instrument of analysis. It was "perfectly inert" in the sense that it provided neither the springs of human action nor the final judgment in questions of moral controversy. In Hume's view, human actions were stimulated initially by the passions, which were a response to a direct emotional experience. The passions, in short, were the active, generating factor in human behavior. Consequently, they could not be yoked or restrained by reason, as the rationalists maintained, because this would be to argue that an inert principle could control an active one. Hence the famous conclusion: "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."' Passions were thus outside the range of rational criticism, except as they might be based on a false supposition about objects which had no existence, or as the passions selected inadequate means for the fulfillment of their ends. Reason could indicate the tendencies and consequences of certain actions, but sentiment or feeling alone could actively stimulate us to follow one choice rather than another. Again, reason dealt with facts and relations, but moral concepts, such as 'crime' or 'ingratitude,' were not analyzable as facts or relations except by ignoring the original source of the concept itself in our sentiments or feelings. For example, certain elements of a 'crime' could be analyzed by the understanding into components, but the totality of these did not equal a 'crime'; it was only as our feelings affixed such a designation that certain actions took on a moral meaning. "The approbation or blame which then ensues cannot be the work of judg- ment, but of the heart... ."1 Thus, since morals were linked to the passions or feelings, and since reason was unable to master the latter, it followed that morals could never be designated true or false, reasonable or unreasonable. The net effect of this argument was, of course, to undermine the whole theory of natural law with its immutable values discoverable by rational inquiry. Having withdrawn morals from the jurisdiction of reason, Hume was prepared to maintain that morality was "more properly felt than judged of."'1 Morality derived from a moral sense which received impressions; these might be either pleasing or displeasing. Actions or situations which cause pleasing impressions men have identified as good or virtuous, their contraries as bad. When it is asked, what is it that renders some impressions pleasurable and others painful, Hume's reply was that in some instances it was "natural" for men to feel delight or aversion; in other cases the response was due to habit or conditioning. Morals were, then, a product of nature or convention, but, as Hume pointed out in his discussion of justice:
Mankind is an inventive species; and where an invention is obvious and absolutely necessary, it may as properly be said to be natural as anything that proceeds immediately from original principles, without the intervention of thought and reflection. Though the rules of justice be artificial, they are not arbitrary.12
Thus art could be fused with nature, and when innovation became overlain with habit the distinction between the artificial and the natural vanished.
There existed, in this line of argument, a subtle difference between Hume and later conservatives. Some conservatives, Sir William Blackstone for example, were to maintain that a rational institution or law could be declared "natural" on the grounds that its long existence demonstrated its rationality and naturalness. Hume, however, in denying the relationship between the rational and the natural, was asserting quite another basis for the validity of institutions: an arrangement might, through usage, become habitual and therefore "natural," but this had nothing to do with its rationality and rationality had nothing to do with it.
The full implications of Hume's analysis were not to be realized until after the revolutionary events in America and France had made their mark. Prior to that time little difference existed between conservative and radical theorists in the approach taken to political problems. The points of disagreement between John Adams and Jefferson in America, Blackstone and Priestley in England, or D'Argenson and Diderot in France were less striking than the degree to which they shared a common premise that the test of a political system or a particular policy was a matter of rational demonstration. The influence of Hume's iconoclasm, however, was to dissolve this area of agreement by show-ing that ultimate truths could not be proven by rational methods. And after 1789 both sides were to become increasingly preoccupied with ultimate truths. By restricting reason to a narrow zone between experience and the passions, Hume cleared the way for political romanticism. "Nothing is freer," he wrote, "than the imagination of man.... The difference between fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling, which is annexed to the latter, not to the former, and which depends not on the will, nor can be commanded at pleasure."'3
In fairness to Hume it should be noted that his remarks cannot be turned into a justification for some of the later extravagances of the romantics. Habit, emotion, and imagination did not constitute political values in his system, but belonged to the catalog of descriptive facts concerning human behavior. They might, and often did, have valuable consequences, yet they were not values in themselves. It was true that on occasion Hume might casually remark that in philosophy, as in music and poetry, "we must follow our taste and sentiment,"14 but he was aware that this might prove too much. After all, he cautioned, there was a clear difference between "a poetical enthusiasm" and "a serious conviction" resting on "reflexion and general rules."'5 Negatively, however, Hume's labors worked towards the alteration of the future course of conservatism. With reason discredited, new premises could be fashioned from custom and sentiment.
II
The quest for a science of politics was one of the great intellectual adventures of the Enlightenment."6 It was believed, perhaps not logically, that a science of this kind would be a natural ally of reform and progress. It was almost inevitable, given the cautious disposition of conservatives towards political and social change, that a deep hostility towards a science of politics should color conservative thought of the late eighteenth century. Here again Hume took a different tack. While sharing the conservative distrust of reform, he was still convinced that the study of politics could achieve the status of a science. At the same time, he demonstrated that there was no inherent necessity that such a science led to radical conclusions.
Although Hume remarked in one place that "the world is still too young to fix many general truths in politics which will remain true to the latest posterity,"'' his works were studded with references to "causes and principles eternal and immutable" and to "universal axioms." While he admitted that social sciences, dealing as they did with matters of fact, could not aspire to the same degree of certitude as mathematics, dealing as it did with relations between 13 ideas, Hume did go so far as to assert that the social sciences were capable of the same degree of certitude as the physical sciences. He further maintained that "politics, natural philosophy, physics, chemistry, etc.," which employ "moral reasoning," were more securely grounded than the study of morals or aesthetics; the latter were "not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment." This was not to imply that politics, any more than the other sciences, could transcend experience or explain "ultimate principles."' Nor was it meant to deny that "irregular and extraordinary appearances" might defy attempts to reduce political phenomena to near-mathematical axioms."9 Despite these qualifications, Hume's conviction remained unshaken that, as the title of one of his essays suggested, "politics may be reduced to a science" if it adheres to "experimental" procedures rather than the methods of traditional logic. Logic, which relied on demonstrations founded on the understanding, was useless for dealing with the probabilities which were of the essence of man's actual life in society. A science of politics, therefore, must be grounded in experience supplied by historical inquiry and observation of existing societies. Essentially, it was to be an investigation into the interaction between institutions and human nature From an historical point of view, the function of political institutions had been to channel and control human behavior. Institutions were, in short, artificial contrivances which exerted an independent force and were not merely a reflex or simple reaction to human drives. "So great is the force of laws and particular forms of government, and so little dependence have they on the humours and tempers of men, that consequences almost as general and certain may sometimes be deduced from them as any which the mathematical sciences afford us.""2 Hume's method of political analysis, as noted earlier, was grounded in the typical Enlightenment technique of "analytic dissection," which, to borrow Cassirer's description, "dissolves everything merely factual. . . and everything believed on the evidence of revelation, tradition and authority" as preliminary to the ultimate goal of "synthetic reconstruction."' Hume pressed this approach with devastating effect against the state-of-nature hypothesis present in some social contract theorizing. He pointed out the slippery logic which sought to justify rebellion against authority on the basis of a "mere philosophical fiction" like the state of nature; he denied that society was simply the product of a voluntary agreement aimed at eliminating certain "inconveniences" present in the pre-social condition. The arrangement called society represented an accumulated set of responses to human needs and drives: to the "natural appetite betwixt the sexes" and to man's oscillation between altruism-which diminishes in force as it is extended through the concentric circles of self, family, friends, and strangers-and selfishness-which increases as socie- tal demands become more abstract and remote. Furthermore, as man found himself situated amidst circumstances of material scarcity his insecurity deepened, leading him to invade the material possessions of his fellows. This "natural" condition could be overcome by artificial arrangements which would restrain man's "heedless and impetuous passion" and gratify his instinct for self-interest.22 "After that interest is once established and acknowledged, the sense of morality in the observance of these rules follows naturally and of itself."23
In his explanation Hume made no sharp distinction between government and society. Government was viewed as the instrument whereby society's arrangements were protected and society's purposes executed. Consequently, when Hume came to discuss the problem of political obligation his argument paralleled to a large extent his explanation of society. His aim, in both cases, was to demonstrate that neither society nor government had emerged full-blown from a sudden agreement. The basis of government was traceable to consent only in the sense that every government required that its subjects agree to its existence. To label this obvious truism a contractual agreement only worked to distort the element of truth contained in the idea of contract, namely, that "it is on opinion only... that government is founded. ..."24 "Opinion," in turn, was composed of several aspects. First, there was "opinion of interest" which referred to the "sense of the general advantage which is reaped from government, together with the persuasion that the particular government which is established is equally advantageous with any other that could easily be settled." Second, there was "opinion of right" which comprehended (a) the "right to power" or the prevalent disposition of men to believe that governments which have endured over a long period of time were legitimate governments; and (b) the "right to property" or the general desire of men to secure their possessions. Such were the "principles" which supported government. Viewed from this perspective, the "ought" element in political obligation was reduced to a secondary consequence following from certain naturalistic considerations. Men obeyed because the interests which they sought to protect and promote necessitated obedience to authority. "Society could not otherwise subsist."25 According to Hume's view, all of the rules of society were "artificial" in that they represented conscious contrivances designed to meet human needs and problems. As rules of convenience they could not be expected to satisfy the demands of morality or strict logic. For example, the rules of justice might result in a wicked miser winning a legal judgment against a virtuous peasant, yet the necessity and value of a general rule excludes consideration of the "fitness or unfitness of objects to particular persons."26 The essential point was that there was no sharp contrast between an "artificial" rule and a "natural" one. Through the passage of time men became accustomed to social expedients, and what was once artifical soon became natural. It followed that the "natural" was not necessarily the primitive or the original condition. Hume strongly inferred that the opposite was more likely: that the truly unnatural situation was to be found in the state of nature.
The significant element in Hume's political ideas lies not so much in the particular arguments employed, but rather in the sensitivity displayed towards the workings of actual institutions. Like his contemporaries, he appeared to use the analytical method to dissect institutions, to peel off layer after layer of historical accretion. Yet, unlike that of many of his contemporaries, Hume's method proceeded on the belief that a particular institution was to be viewed as a whole possessing subtle interconnections with other institutional wholes.
Implicit in this approach were two ideas which were to play a central role in later conservative thinking in England. Institutions were to be understood in terms of human needs, but institutions were not merely the product of human needs. The two elements became intertwined and inseparable by virtue of their common root in historical time. It followed that there was no necessary opposition between what was useful and what existed; the desirable and the factual were not out of joint. In this way Hume indicated to later conservatives that the strongest arguments for the existing order were to be found within the facts of that order; that under an empirical approach utility could be located as an immanent value dwelling within the interstices of actual social arrangements, not as a grim measuring rod contrived to reveal the shortcomings of institutions.
Moreover, institutions were developments over a period of time. Their purpose and nature could not be correctly understood without a sense of time. The concept of time, then, was closely associated with the blending of fact and utility. Historical time imparted to social arrangements a qualitative element. Time implied experience, and experience in turn provided the motive for gradual adjustment. Conversely, the greatest calamity was violent change, which worked to snap the close union which history had fashioned between an institution, its utility, and its duration. In contradicting the nature of time and experience, sweeping change could not adapt institutions according to utility; for utility, in political matters, was inseparable from time and experience.
Students of political theory have, as yet, paid insufficient attention to the concept of time and the part that it has played in the shaping of political theory. To the eighteenth-century liberal reformer, time appeared as a kind of quantitative duration, a series of succeeding points without any particular value, except of a negative character. Future time alone held the promise of a qualitative character. To the conservatives who followed Burke, however, time lent an essentially qualitative element to existing arrangements. Past time had not really been superseded, but merged into the present in the form of institutions and values. Drastic change, in the same way that it had contradicted utility, contradicted time. In seeking to sever past time from present and future time, in order to impute a negative value to the past and a positive value only to the present or future, drastic change stood condemned of being unhistorical and therefore unavailing.
While it would be claiming too much to attribute the whole of the conservative conceptions of time and utility to Hume, it is important to recognize that, within the limits imposed by his own methods and temper, he had glimpsed something of the conservative case.
III
Hume's conservatism was given more concrete expression when he turned from his philosophical writings to his informal essays on society, government, and economics. His detachment was, if anything, reenforced by the complexities which he pronounced present in any political question.27
Although his temperament made him unwilling to join in the party battles of the period, it did not prevent him from making thrusts at both sides, at Tory sentiments about divine right and the royal prerogative, as well as at the precious tenets of Whiggism. But in common with the conservatives of the period Hume had a hearty disdain for that type of radical reformer who thought that every morning the world was an open question:
Did one generation of men go off the stage at once, and another succeed, as in the case with silkworms and butterflies, the new race, if they had sense enough to choose their government, which surely is never the case with men, might voluntarily and by general consent, establish their own form of civil polity, without any regard to the laws or precedents which prevailed among their ancestors. But as human society is in perpetual flux, one man every hour going out of the world, another coming into it, it is necessary, in order to preserve stability in government, that the new brood should conform themselves to the established constitution, and nearly follow the path which their fathers, treading in the footsteps of theirs, had marked out to them. Some innovations must necessarily have place in every human institution . . . but violent innovations no individual is entitled to make.28 Hume's scorn of "novelties" also rested on the conviction that settled forms and institutions carried a momentum which often nullified the efforts of evil men and happily compensated for the meager talents of others:
In the smallest court or office, the stated forms and methods by which business must be conducted are found to be a considerable check on the natural depravity of mankind.... And so little dependence has this affair on the humours and education of particular men that one part of the same republic may be wisely conducted and another weakly by the same men, merely on account of the differences of the forms and institutions by which these parts are regulated....
Good laws may beget order and moderation in the government where the manners and customs have instilled little humanity or justice into the tempers of men.29
But where Burke would have looked for some divine cunning to account for these phenomena, Hume was content to point out the utilitarian basis of institutions and the strong support which they found in human habits. He was at one with Burke in being skeptical of man's ability to effect reforms that 27 For a statement about the detached observer, see "Of the Protestant Succession,)" Works, Vol. This fear and distrust of violent antagonisms underlay Hume's analysis of party politics, for this analysis was motivated by a practical purpose: to prevent in his time the recrudescence of the seventeenth-century struggles by showing the many points of agreement between Tories and Whigs, or, as he more accurately called them, the "court" and "country" parties. Although the method which he adopted, which was to apportion praise and blame impartially to both sides, rested on the hope that sweet reasonableness would prevent both parties from adopting mutually exclusive positions, this was of less significance than the realistic analysis of the nature of parties which preceded his conclusions. To be sure, earlier political writers, like Halifax, Bolingbroke, Swift, and Defoe, had all been aware of the increasingly important role played by "factions" or parties in the constitutional system. Yet among these writers there remained a lingering reluctance to accept "party" as anything but a distasteful necessity. "The best Party," wrote Halifax, "is but a kind of Conspiracy against the rest of the Nation."32
In his discusssion of parties or factions-the terms were used interchangeably-Hume began from a position similar to that of James Madison in Number 10 of the Federalist Papers: since it was not possible to eliminate parties under a free government, some means must be found of limiting their disruptive and predatory tendencies. It was necessary, then, to draw a distinction between those parties which posed a threat to the very existence of a political system and those whose activities, while not always salutary, were confined within reasonable bounds. In the former category Hume placed the fanatical group with uncompromising tenets, a type which had been spawned in abundance during the bitter religious controversies of the last century. Extremist groups, reflecting the dogmatic tempers of their members, were perfectly willing to sacrifice peace and order for the achievement of their objectives: fiat justitia, ruat caelum. Furthermore, the tendency to exaggerate principles into unyielding absolutes was a peculiarly modern phenomenon: "Parties from principle, especially abstract speculative principle, are known only to modern times, and are, perhaps, the most extraordinary and unaccountable phenomenon that has yet appeared in human affairs."33 Although such parties constituted the exception, they represented a pathological condition to which all parties were susceptible. Traces of these symptoms could be found in both the Whigs and Tories. Hume, writing in a period when the uproar over the Hanoverian succession had not completely died down and when Jacobite memories and hopes were still strong, repeatedly warned of the consequences that would follow if party distinctions were allowed to harden. That this eventuality need not come about was the whole lesson of Hume's analysis of parties.
In his dissection of the anatomy of party, Hume found a compound of interests, principles, and sentimental attachment to certain leaders. Two broad types of parties existed: those founded on the personal attraction of a particular leader or group of leaders, and those founded on "real" differences of opinions or of interests.34 Most parties were a compound of the two and this was fortunate, for it meant that principles, interests, and personal ambitions tended to offset each other. In particular, the tugs of personal rivalry and economic interests lessened the possibility of conflicts over questions of political or religiolls principles. To a sceptic and a moderate like Hume, the disputes over principle were largely meaningless, because the historic quarrels which had given birth to the conflicting ideas had long since been settled. The Whigs, Hume noted, regarded themselves as the sole heirs of the revolutionary traditions of 1688 and their arguments implied that the revolutionary settlement stood in constant danger of being overthrown. The Tories, on the other side, responded in the opposite vein: they represented the sole defenders of a monarchy that had been temporarily abolished by the forerunners of the Whigs; it was the Tory mission to insist on the primacy of the allegiance owed by subject to sovereign. In actuality, Hume commented, these antics were largely absurd because of the fundamental similarity between both parties. Both had accepted the results of 1688; neither wanted to abolish the monarchy. The division between them rested on a matter of emphasis. It lay in the shades of meaning which each side attached to certain accepted fundamentals. "A TORY, therefore, since the revolution . .. [is] a lover of monarchy, though without abandoning liberty; and a partisan of the family of Stuart. A WHIG may be defined to be a lover of liberty without renouncing monarchy, and a friend to the settlement in the Protestant line."35 His advice to both parties was to be moderate, accept the present situation, and pursue the public good. There were, he remarked dryly, "enough zealots on both sides."36
In emphasizing that a substantial area of agreement existed between the two parties Hume put his finger on the most singular aspect of the modern British party system. From it he drew the conclusion that it was both desirable and possible to create "a coalition of parties" which would govern England with a minimum of discord. "The transition from a moderate opposition against an establishment, to an entire acquiescence in it, is easy and insensible."37 "Coali- Although the importance of the concept of balance might be admitted for the realm of constitutional theory, the query arises: how much was this idea a creation existing solely in the minds of closet philosophers and how closely did it correspond to the actual workings of the constitution of the time? Although the dominant theme of parliamentary supremacy was obtrusive at certain times,4' there was, by and large, an implicit cooperation between the various branches of government. Hence, there is no paradox in the statement by Sir William Holdsworth that during the period of Whig supremacy from roughly 1720 until 1760 the constitutional system resembled a partnership, but not on equal terms, of King, Lords, and Commons. 42 When it is asked, by what means was this semblance of balance maintained, the answer is to be found largely in the conventions interwoven in the general constitutional fabric.43 As contemporary British historians, under the inspiration of Sir Lewis Namier, have demonstrated, the nucleus about which these conventions clustered was the system of "influence," that is, the ties of family, patronage, contracts, bribes, and corruption through which the King and his ministers managed the parliamentary machinery.44 This system, developed by Walpole and Newcastle and perfected later by George III, was not incidental to the politics of the period, but was a crucial element. Without it, the British constitution would have too closely resembled the nicely compartmented separation of powers that Montesquieu imagined in his Esprit des Lois. The conventions of the period, including the system of "influence," supplied the lubrication necessary to insure that the machinery of government would work in coordinated fashion and with a degree of central direction provided by the Crown.
Although many writers and politicians were aware of the part played by "influence" in preserving an area of royal initiative, Hume, perhaps alone, had grasped the tactical role of this system in preserving the constitutional balance.45 He began by raising doubts about the validity of Harrington's widelyaccepted thesis that political stability depended upon a coincidence between property and political power.48 The paradox of the British system, Hume contended, was that although property and power had gravitated from the King to the House of Commons, there was no evident disposition on the part of the House to usurp all the powers of government so as to leave the King helpless. It was apparent that the House could not be considered as a kind of passive funnel through which the propertied interests exerted overwhelming mastery. The question then became: what were the means by which the dominant partner of the constitution was confined within its proper limits? His answer was that the interest of the body is here restrained by that of the individuals, and that of the house of commons stretches not its power, because such an usurpation would be contrary to the interest of the majority of its members. The crown has so many offices at its disposal, that, when assisted by the honest and disinterested part of the house, it will always command the resolutions of the whole, so far, at least, as to preserve the ancient constitution from danger.47
Rail as men may at the "invidious appellations of corruption and dependence," it must not be forgotten, as men are apt to do in the heat of party strife, that "some degree and some kind of it are inseparable from the very nature of the constitution, and necessary to the preservation of our mixed government."48 The proper course for the zealots of liberty and parliamentary independence was not one of demanding a root-and-branch extirpation of patronage and its attendant evils, but of exercising prudent vigilance over "the proper degree of this dependence, beyond which it became dangerous to liberty."49 More than any other observer, Hume saw that whatever balance there was in the constitution resembled less the mechanical equipoise of Newtonian forces than a restless equilibrium whose components were hidden from the prevailing formal and legalistic types of analysis. It followed that it was unrealistic to define rigidly the boundaries of power between the three main participants of the constitutional system.50 Custom and expediency, not speculative reason, had shaped the constitution. Accordingly, these highly artificial political arrangements could not be measured by the rigors of abstract theory. Furthermore, as the system had demonstrated its ability to combine both liberty and order and had behind it the inertia of the settled habits of a nation, it was folly "to tamper . .. or try experiments upon the credit of supposed argument and philosophy.. Although Hume's appreciation of existing institutions and his realization of the long, painful, and largely unconscious process by which society is shaped led him in the same general direction as the lawyers, the journey was accomplished by his effecting a minor revolution in political thought. Politics was now to be conceived in psychological rather than juridical categories. Earlier writers, like Locke and Hobbes, while emphasizing the importance of human nature for the understanding of politics, had nevertheless approached this element as preliminary to the central juridical concept of contract. In this way, the political categories of allegiance, obligation, and justice assumed the status of logical derivatives from the basic concept of sovereignty (or as Locke preferred to call it, "supreme power") established by the contract. Hume, on the other band, turned the procedure around: justice, obligation, and authority were consequences of human attitudes and expectations. These concepts were to be explained on psychological, not juridical grounds.
The psychologism of Hume was part of his general legacy to later conservatism, a legacy of empiricism in which the useful and the factual were made to cohere in subtle fashion. Yet it was also a legacy which later events superseded. Hume, appropriately enough, died in 1776, and from this point on revolutionary events worked to make a mockery of Hume's comfortable conclusions. The realm of fact provided cold comfort for conservatives; it was now controlled by the revolutionaries. The central fact of revolution could not be explained away, although a Burke might attribute it to intellectual perversity and a De Maistre to an avenging Deity. But if it could not be ignored, it could be transcended. So it was that conservatives began to turn to transcendental norms in order to combat the revolutionary appeal to reason; to weave from the diverse elements of irrationalism, romanticism, religion, and history a new vision of an older order; to replace an analytical conservatism by a metaphysical conservatism. In so doing they rejected much of Hume's naturalistic approach and substituted in its stead a philosophy of history, the idea that history had a "course" whose main outlines were determined by a divine hand operating from outside the confines of human time.
The final assessment of Hume raises certain difficulties. In some respects he typified conservatism, in others liberalism, and in still others he belonged to no school but his own. His conclusions in political matters carried strong overtones of conservatism, yet most conservatives of the period felt too uncomfortable with Hume's skepticism to welcome him as one of their own. Nevertheless, his conclusions were conservative for the reason that Hume never probed past a certain point nor carried his skepticism to its ultimate conclusions. He held too much respect for custom and tradition, and for their importance as social cements, to subject them to the kind of devastating critique which Voltaire and his allies were employing in France. With later conservatives he shared a distrust of reform, an hostility toward abstractions, and a skepticism of the claims of reason.
On the other hand, Hume stood close to the liberals of the century in the respect be accorded to liberty and property, and in his decided coolness toward religion and anything bordering on obscurantism. Above all, his political thought contained no traces of the particularist bent which was to play such an important role in later conservative thought. National history, national peculiarities and values had not yet replaced the universalist or European assumptions of seventeenth-and eighteenth-century rationalism.52
It would be easy to conclude from these remarks that the categories of "liberal" and "conservative" were irrelevant when applied to Hume. This, however, would be misleading. The significant point is that Hume's position was symptomatic of the change that was taking place in English liberalism around the middle of the eighteenth century. Liberalism was becoming conservatized. Seventeenth-century liberalism, which had been compounded from the criticisms and protests of the Civil War period and then reshaped in more moderate fashion by the Glorious Revolution, had been transformed. It had lost its status as a challenge to the established order and had become the order itself. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, England was commit-62 The exception to this point was Hurme's interest in "national character." Although he suggested that certain common traits, such as similar manners and habits, could be discovered in a people who had been associated over a long period of time, this idea was not employed to prove any qualitative differences among peoples. Note also the statement in Human Understanding, sec. 8, pt. 1: "Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans? Study well the temper and actions of the French and English: You cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the former most of the observations which you have made with regard to the latter. Mankind are so much the same in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular." ted to the idea of government under law, the superiority of Parliament, and the rights of Englishmen. The incorporation of liberal elements into the political structure worked to rid liberal thought of one of its central themes: its revolt against the idea of the organic community. The idea of a corporate societycompact, graded, deeply-niched by place and privilege-had been a commonplace in Tudor thought, as well as in the royalist doctrines of the seventeenth century.53 The reaction to this belief in a close community, with all that it implied in social and political policies, can be traced not only in the radical doctrines of the Civil War, but also in such diverse thinkers as Hobbes and Locke. The systems of Hobbes and Locke began with abstractions which cut through the communal bonds of class, status, and hierarchy, leaving only unattached and undifferentiated individuals. In neither system was there a "sense of community. "
Once English society was modified by the revolutionary changes of the seventeenth century, the theme of revolt was gradually replaced by a growing "sense of society," a quickening appreciation of the extent to which the values established by protest and revolt had become deeply dependent on communal arrangements of an unwritten and informal nature. Tiume was representative of this changing temper, which prized the gains made possible by the upheavals of the previous century, and sought to preserve both the institutional achievements and their social undergirding. In this way, the assumption of an organic community, which had been cast aside during the seventeenth century, was being recaptured. 
